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Securities and Exchange Commission rule lOb-5 has become well
known as providing broad and important remedies for aggrieved
investors.' After avoiding rule lOb-5 for many years, the Supreme
,Court has recently construed the rule in several decisions. 2 The Court
has recognized that an implied private right to enforce rule lOb-5
exists, stating in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas-

ualty Co.3 that "[i]t is now established that a private right of action
is implied under Section 10(b)."I The Court's general approval of rule
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1.The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970) [hereinafter cited
as the 1934 Act] provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972) [hereinafter cited as rule lob-5] promulgated under section 10(b)
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(i) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) To engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
2. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Superintendent of Ins. v.
Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971). The first Supreme Court decision interpreting
rule 1Ob-5 was SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969). The Court heard a prior case
involving rule lob-5 but did not interpret the rule. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332
(1967).
3. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
4. Id. at 13 n.9, citing VI L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3869-73 (1969); III Loss,
supra, at 1763 et seq. (2d ed. 1961). For a discussion of the development of implied private
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lOb-5 is apparent from the following statements interpreting the rule
in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States:'
[T]he 1934 Act and its companion legislative enactments embrace a "fundamental purpose. . . to substitute a philosophy of full disclosuire for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics
in the securities industry." 6 . . .Congress intended securities legislation enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds to be construed "not technically and
restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes.",

This article identifies several areas in which the interpretation of
facts can serve as a device for limiting liability under rule 1Ob-5 and

advances theories for proper legal analysis of those areas. The areas
discussed include materiality, reliance, causation, scienter and statutes of limitation-legal aspects of a rule lOb-5 cause of action which
require factual findings to be made to.' The article concludes that
right theories, see Comment, PrivateRemedies Under the Consumer Fraud Acts: The Judicial
Approaches of Statutory Interpretationand Implication, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 413 (1972), and
articles cited in Ruder, Current Developments in the Federal Law of Corporate Fiduciary
Relations-Standing to Sue Under Rule lOb-5, 26 Bus. LAW. 1289, 1289-90 n.4 (1971).
5. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
6. Id. at 151, quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186
(1963).
7. Id., quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. at 195, and noting
the subsequent approval of similar language in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas.
Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
8. Although the general analysis in this article will not be specifically directed to aspects
of the securities laws other than rule lOb-5, some of the discussion will be applicable to the
development of remedies in other acts. For instance, the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15
U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1970), has been interpreted in many recent decisions to permit private
actions to enforce fiduciary obligations. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir.
1971); Moses v. Burgin, 316 F. Supp. 31 (D. Mass. 1970), affd in part and modified, 445 F.2d
369 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971); Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207
(S.D.N.Y.), affd on other grounds, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961). Brouk v. Managed Funds,
Inc., 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 366 U.S. 958 (1961), vacated as moot upon
settlement, 369 U.S. 424 (1962), apparently reached an opposite result, but the Eighth Circuit
has indicated its desire to disavow Brouk. See Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783
(8th Cir. 1967). See generally Note, PrivateRights ofAction Against Mutual Fund Investment
Advisers: Amended Section 36 of the 1940 Act, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 143 (1971). Margin
regulations are also privately enforceable. See. e.g., Pearlstein v. Scudder and German, 429
F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970), rev'g and remanding, 295 F. Supp. 1197 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Serzysko
v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 409 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969). The trend appears to be toward permitting private enforcement of stock exchange rules and the rules of the National Association of Securities Dealers.
For an early leading case discussing the problem of private enforcement of such rules, see
Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817
(1966). For cases in the Seventh Circuit indicating the trend toward private enforcement, see
SEC v. First Sec. Co., 466 F.2d 1035 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding that NASD rule 27 is privately
enforceable), reprintedin 1972 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 93,430; Avern Trust v. Clarke, 415
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courts have sufficient leeway in factual determination so that com-

pensation for injured investors and deterrence of wrong-doing can
be accomplished without great unfairness to defendants. In evaluating the factual determination process in the five areas under con-

sideration, specific suggestions will be made regarding desirable
legal interpretation and future development.'
THE ORIGIN OF RULE

lOb-5

According to the testimony of one of the drafters of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, section 10(b) was intended to be a "catch-all
clause to prevent manipulative devices."' 0 When rule lOb-5 was
drafted, it was apparently aimed at giving the Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement power over activities by purchasers
of securities who induced sales through misrepresentations, halftruths or nondisclosure." The rule, modeled after section 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act)," was promulgated in May of
F.2d 1238, 1242 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 963 (1970) (stating in dictum that a
private right of action exists to enforce section 2 of article
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1942.13 Its first reported use by the SEC came in a 1943 case, In re
Ward La France Truck Corp."
Although the 1934 Act does not provide an express right to pri-

vate parties to enforce rule lOb-5, the Supreme Court's Bankers Life
statement' s and its grant of a private remedy in the Affiliated Ute
Citizens litigation 8 seem to have settled the private remedy ques-

tion.' 7 These cases stem from J.I. Case v. Borak," which held that
an implied private right of action exists for violation of the federal
proxy rules 9 on the theory that the phrase "the protection of investors" implies the availability of a private right of action "where
necessary to achieve that result. ' 2 The broad approach taken by the
Court in Borak toward development of implied remedies has assisted
13. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942).
14. 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943).
15. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
16. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
17. Arguably, the Bankers Life case and the Affiliated Ute Citizens case could be distinguished on their facts; thus, to some extent the private rights question can be considered to be
unsettled. Bankers Life involved alleged fraud in connection with the disposition of proceeds
from the sale of corporate securities. Affiliated Ute Citizens involved sale of securities by the
plaintiffs to and through bank employees owing fiduciary obligations to the plaintiffs. Since
both of these cases involved activities for which no express private remedy is provided in either
the 1933 or 1934 Acts, opportunity may still exist for a defendant to argue in the Supreme
Court that a remedy should not be implied in circumstances in which an express private remedy
also exists. However, it is noteworthy that circuit courts have not accepted arguments that no
remedy should be implied when a private remedy exists under sections 11 and 12(2) of the 1933
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 1(2) (1970), or sections 9 and 18 of the 1934 Act, id. §§ 78i, r. See Jordan
Build. Corp. v. Doyle, O'Connor & Co., 401 F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1968) (rejecting a contention
that the statute of limitations contained in section 29(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (1970), governs an
action against brokers and stating that remedies under the securities acts are "cumulative");
Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961) (holding that despite similar provisions in section
12(2) of the 1933 Act, a buyer's remedy will be provided under rule lOb-5); Fischman v.
Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951) (holding that a rule lob-5 action will exist
where an element of fraud is added to the requirements needed for violation of section 11 of
the 1933 Act).
Some support for an opposite result may be reached by an examination of cases such as
Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank, 326 F. Supp. 1186 (N.D. I11.
1970), ordergrantingappeal rev'd,
465 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1972), in which the district court found an argument that section 9(e)
provides the exclusive remedy for market manipulation "logically persuasive," id. at 1189, but
rejected defendant's argument in reliance upon the authority of Jordan and Gilbert v. Nixon,
429 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1970). In the Gilbert decision, the Tenth Circuit had admitted that an
action under rule lOb-5 could exist despite a remedy under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act but
had resolved conflicts between the two remedies by reading the limitations of section 12(2) into
the rule lOb-5 remedy.
18. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
19. Id. at 432.
20. Id.
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in the development of rule lOb-5 on an ad hoc basis in an extremely
2
"flexible" fashion. 1
COVERAGE OF THE RULE

The language of rule 10b-5 is extremely broad. The rule makes it

unlawful for "any person directly or indirectly" to engage in certain
prohibited activities "in connection with the purchase or sale of any

security." 2 As the interpretation of the rule has developed, the number and variety of prohibited activities have increased. The proscribed
activities include misrepresentations2 and half-truths, 2 which are
forbidden by subsection two of the rule. More important, however,
subsections one and three prohibit employment of "any device,
scheme or artifice to defraud ' 25 or use of "any act, practice or course
of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit.

'26

This language has been interpreted to prohibit nondisclosure in circumstances in which a duty to disclose is said to exist.2 It has also

been interpreted to prohibit nonverbal acts, such as the failure to
declare a dividend

or mismanagement of a corporation,2 9 where the

purpose is to drive down the price of shares so that insiders can
benefit by purchasing at low prices."
21. See generally Friendly, In Praiseof Erie-And of the New FederalCommon Law, 39
N.Y.U.L. REV. 383, 413-14 (1964); Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity
and State of Mind in Rule lob-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 423, 430-33
(1968). The most vigorous champion of rule 10b-5 has been the General Counsel's Office of
the Securities and Exchange Commission, which has been active in the development of rule lob5 doctrine on a case-by-case basis since its early participation as amicus curiae in Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (motion to dismiss), 73 F. Supp. 798
(E.D. Pa. 1947) (on merits), 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1948) (findings of fact and law). The
Kardon case was the first case holding that an implied private right of action exists to enforce
rule 10b-5.
22. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972).
23. Id. § 240.10b-5(2).
24. Id.
25. Id. § 240.10b-5(i).
26. Id. § 240.10b-5(3).
27. E.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), affd in part
and rev'd in part, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), on remand,
312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd in partand rev'd in part, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971), decision on remand, 331 F. Supp. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
28. Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
29. Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
30. In cases which have clearly involved reprehensible conduct, the federal courts have
applied rule 10b-5 directly to assess damages against broker-dealers. For instance, in Hecht v.
Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970), modifying and affg, 283 F. Supp. 417
(N.D. Cal. 1968), the Ninth Circuit affirmed the imposition of monetary damages upon the

1130

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1972:1125

PURCHASE AND SALE CASES

Rule lOb-5 is best known in cases involving purchases or sales of
securities, the so-called trading cases, and the discussion in this article
is directed primarily to those cases. In trading cases the rule has been
applied to direct transactions between individuals since the early case
of Fratt v. Robinson.3 ' It has also been applied to market transactions.32 In either direct or market transactions it is unlawful for any
person to make a misrepresentation in connection with the purchase
or sale of a security. Misrepresentation doctrines are applied equally
to all defendants, without regard to the relationship between the
plaintiff and the defendant. All persons may be said to be under a
33
duty to speak truthfully.
On the other hand, when a securities transaction occurs without
disclosure of non-public material corporate information, liability will
depend upon the identity of the offending party. At present, obligations to disclose when purchasing or selling securities exist for officers, directors, and majority shareholders, 34 as well as for other
persons who are in a special relationship to a company and privy to
its internal affairs so that they receive access to information intended
to be available only for a corporate purpose.3 5 These obligations are
also imposed upon "tippees" who trade without disclosure.3'
In addition to identifying the duty which every person owes not
to make misrepresentations and the duty which an insider or "tippee"
New York partners of a broker-dealer who had failed to supervise a registered representative
properly. 430 F.2d at 1209-10. The representative had churned a customer's account. Regarding
broker-dealer obligations generally, see cases cited in Hecht, id. at 1207. For discussion of
churning, see Comment, Churningby Securities Dealers, 80 HARv. L. REv. 869 (1967): Note,
Churning: A Critical Analysis, 14 N.Y.L.F. 315 (1968). In Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co.,
438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970), the Second Circuit imposed liability upon a brokerage firm which
failed to reveal to its customer that it was a market maker in the security which it sold to that
customer. On the other hand, customers' activities have also been subject to rule lOb-5 remedies. In A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967), the Second Circuit reversed
the district court's dismissal of a complaint in a broker-dealer's suit against a customer who
allegedly had ordered securities but intended to pay only if the market value increased. The
court stated'that "novel or atypical methods should not provide immunity from the securities
laws." Id. at 397.
31. 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953).
32. See, e.g., Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951), affd as
modified, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956).
33. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 404 U.S. 1004
(1971).
34. Speed v. Transamerica Co., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951), aff'd as modified, 235 F.2d
369 (3d Cir. 1956); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
35. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
36. See In re Investors Management Co., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
78,163 (SEC 1971).
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owes to make full disclosure when purchasing or selling stock, it is
important to identity those individuals to whom the duty is owed.
Where parties are dealing with each other in face-to-face transactions, it is relatively easy to apply the misrepresentation and nondisclosure doctrines. However, where misrepresentations reach large
groups of purchasers or sellers, or where an insider trades in an
impersonal market in which many other persons are also trading, the
extent of liability will depend in part upon whether a contractual
connection, sometimes referred to as "privity," is required between
the wrongdoer and the injured party. In this regard the federal courts
have in general moved from a relatively restrictive interpretation37
to the liberal conclusion that no privity requirement exists."
Elimination of the doctrine of privity coupled with the growth of
class actions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 has raised
difficult issues in market cases which do not exist in cases involving
direct transactions, since in market cases it is possible for a court to
impose damages in substantial amounts. For instance, in Mitchell v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 39 recovery was granted to three plaintiffs
against a corporation which had not engaged in a trading transaction
but which had issued a misleading press release characterized by the
court as intentional and deliberate.40 Although the Mitchell case did
not involve a class action, its principles are transferable to the class
action setting. The case involved a misrepresentation, deliberate conduct, and an absence of a direct transaction between the plaintiffs and
the defendant. The theory apparently underlying willingness to impose large liability in misrepresentation market cases of the Mitchell
type is that a wrongdoer acting deliberately or recklessly should be
responsible for all of the injuries inflicted by that conduct.
Where the reprehensible market conduct is nondisclosure coupled
37. See Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701, 706 (S.D.N.Y.
1951), aff d, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
38. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp. 548 (D. Utah 1970), aff d
in part and rev'd in part, sub noa., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972). See generally Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The
Second Round, supra note 21; Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases:
Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pan Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U.
PA. L. REV. 597, 618-20 (1972).

39. 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971).
40. Id. at 97-98.

41. Whether such liability should be imposed for negligent conduct is an unsettled and
difficult question. See discussion infra notes 83-94 and accompanying text. See also Ruder,
Multiple Defendants, supra note 38, at 612-18.
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with trading, different policy considerations exist. If liability is limited to those persons who can trace their transactions to the insider,
the plaintiffs who recover will be receiving a windfall due to the
accident that their transactions could be traced to insiders. Additionally, the deterrent value of such a policy will be small, since at most
the defendant will merely lose his profit. Conversely, if a defendant
is required to pay full damages to all persons who traded during the

period of his trading, the defendant may be financially destroyed.
Even if the conduct is deliberate, it is difficult to see how the defendant's act of trading injures anyone other than the person with whom
he deals. Financial destruction in such circumstances seems harsh if
not cruel.
THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS ON OUTCOME

This article does not purport to suggest solutions to the policy
dilemmas created by abolition of the privity requirement. The problems have been identified in order to place the role of courts and juries
in proper perspective. As rule lOb-5 has developed, the possibility of
large damages has given the trier of fact, whether it be court or jury,
enormous responsibility to reach fair decisions. Since rule lOb-5 is
developing on an ad hoc basis, it is appropriate to emphasize the role
which the various elements contained in the rule can play in influencing results. Proper application of these elements can achieve the flexibility inherent in making determinations based upon considerations
of fairness. In the discussion which follows, it is suggested that flexible results in rule lOb-5 cases can be maintained through interpretation of the elements of materiality, reliance, causation and scienter
and through interpretation of statutes of limitation."
THE DEFINITION OF "MATERIAL FACT"

One of the first questions reached by the trier of fact in deciding
a rule lOb-5 trading case will be whether the misrepresented or nondisclosed fact was material. Resolution of that question provides an
initial opportunity to affect liability. In resolving the materiality
question the trier of fact will be applying an objective or reasonable
man test. That test has been most clearly stated in List v. Fashion
Park, Inc.," in which the court stated that the basic test is whether
42. Other available areas of flexibility, such as burden of proof considerations and damages, will not be discussed.
43. 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
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a reasonable man would attach importance to the misrepresented or
nondisclosed information4 in determining his choice of action in the
transaction in question.
In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.1 5 the district court stated that
material information is
information which in reasonable and objective contemplation might affect the
value of the corporation's stock or securities. . . .It is information which, if
known, would clearly affect "investment judgment" . . . or which directly
bears on the intrinsic value of a company's stock. 6

The Tenth Circuit in Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.4 7 recently
stated the following:
Misrepresented or omitted facts become material, hence actionable under lOb5 when, considering the complaining parties as reasonable investors, the disclosure of the undisclosed facts or candid revelation of misleading facts would
affect their trading judgment. . . .The implicit variables to be weighed in a
materiality analysis are the magnitude and probability of the occurrence of the
event, set against the size and total activity of the subject company.4'

The flexibility available to a trier of fact in applying the Tenth
Circuit's definition is obvious. This flexibility may have been expanded further by the Supreme Court's recent use of the word
"might" in referring to the materiality definition. In the Affiliated
Ute Citizens case the Court stated: "All that is necessary is that the
facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable investor
might have considered them important in the making of this decision."49
No matter what the announced definitions of materiality and
material fact are, the manner in which the standards are applied will
probably be the most important factor in determining liability. In
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. the district court found that knowl-

edge as of November 12, 1963, relating to a valuable mineral discovery, was not material until April 9, 1964, a date after which additional
44. Id. at 462, quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 538(2) (1938). This test has been reaffirmed by the Second Circuit. See Radiation Dynamics Inc. v. Goldmutz, 464 F.2d 876 (2d
Cir. 1972); Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970); SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968), aff'g 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1968).
45. 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
46. Id. at 280 (citations omitted).
47. 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971).
48. Id. at 97 (citations omitted).
49. 406 U.S. at 153-54 (emphasis added).
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drilling results were known.50 On the other hand, the court of appeals
held that the drilling results were material on the earlier date.5' As a
result of the court of appeals' opinion additional defendants were
found to have violated rule lOb-5.5 2 The two opinions seem to reflect
different views regarding the equities of the case rather than differ.ences regarding definition.13 The court of appeals clearly indicated
its willingness to treat the materiality requirement flexibly by the
following statement:
In each case, then, whether facts are material within Rule 1Ob-5 when the facts
relate to a particular event and are undisclosed by those persons who are
knowledgeable thereof will depend at any given time upon a balancing of both

the indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company activity."
THE RELIANCE REQUIREMENT

Closely related to the concept of materiality is the requirement
of "reliance." To the extent that a reliance requirement exists, the
trier of fact must determine whether the plaintiff relied upon the
misrepresentation or nondisclosure. In making its determination, the
trier of fact will be applying a subjective test to the facts at hand. The
Second Circuit set forth the following definition of the reliance requirement in List v. Fashion Park, Inc.: 5
[T]he test of "reliance" is whether "the misrepresentation is a substantial

factor in determining the course of conduct which results in [the recipient's]
loss." 5 '

Although the concept of reliance is difficult to apply in a nondisclosure case, the Second Circuit did so in List, characterizing the test
as "whether the plaintiff would have been influenced to act differently
than he did act if the defendant had disclosed to him the undisclosed
fact." 57
In common vernacular the reliance requirement means that no
50. 258 F. Supp. at 282.
51. 401 F.2d 833, 852 (2d Cir. 1968).
52. Id. at 851-56.
53. The Second Circuit attempted to meet this point by stating that the district court had
chosen a standard which was too "conservative." Id. at 849. Despite this explanation, it seems
clear that the different holding in the court of appeals resulted because the appellate judges
found the defendants' conduct more reprehensible than did the lower court judge.
54. Id. at 849.
55. 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
56. 340 F.2d at 462, quoting REsTATEMENT OF TORTS § 546 (1938).
57. Id. at 463.
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rule lOb-5 recovery will be permitted where the plaintiff did not care
whether or not the facts represented to him were true or would not
have acted differently had the true facts been revealed to him, even
though a reasonable investor might have been influenced by knowledge of the true facts. For instance, in the List case the court held
that it need not consider whether the identity of the buyer of securities
was a material fact to the plaintiff List because List had such confidence in his own financial wisdom that the identity of the buyer was
of little or no concern to him.5"
Retention of a reliance requirement in rule 1Ob-5 cases involving
direct face-to-face transactions is a useful way of preserving options
for the trier of fact. For instance, the judge or jury may decide the
case in the defendant's favor by determining that the plaintiff did not
care about the facts represented or would not have been influenced
by the facts omitted. However, application of the reliance requirement in class actions resulting from market transactions is much
more difficult. In a class action setting, the problem is that the "kinds
or degrees of reliance" may be so diverse that the litigation is no
longer suitable for treatment as a class action.59 While such a contention may be met by a holding that the nature of the misrepresentation
or nondisclosure is such that a common core of reliance probably
exists, proof of reliance nevertheless must be presented on an individual basis at some point in the litigation. 0 Individual trials on the
reliance point, if required, may prove either too costly or too burdensome to be justified. Pressures thus exist either to eliminate the reliance requirement or to declare that an action requiring proof of
58. Id. at 464. See also Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 641-42 (7th Cir. 1963).
59. The Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has stated the
problem as follows:
The court is required to find, as a condition of holding that a class action may be
maintained under this subdivision, that the questions common to the class predominate

over the questions affecting individual members. It is only where this predominance
exists that economies can be achieved by means of the class-action device. In this view,
a fraud perpetrated on numerous persons by the use of similar misrepresentations may
be an appealing situation for a class action, and it may remain so despite the need, if

liability is found, for separate determination of the damages suffered by individuals
within the class. On the other hand, although having some common core, a fraud case
may be unsuited for treatment as a class action if there was material variation in the
representations made or in the kinds or degrees of reliance by the persons to whom they
were addressed. ProposedAmendments to Rules of Civil Procedure,39 F.R.D. 69, 103

(1966).
See generally Note, The Impact of ClassActions on Rule lOb-5, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 337, 342-

45 (1971).
60. Some courts have avoided considering the question whether proof of reliance by individ-
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individual reliance is not a proper subject for a class action.
In lieu of accepting either of the last two more drastic suggestions,
a solution more consistent with concepts of fairness would be to treat
reliance as presumed in class action cases, subject to rebuttal where
appropriate. The presumption approach is consistent with results in
recent class action cases, although the word "presumption" has not
been used. For instance, the List court interpreted Speed v. Transamerica Corp." as permitting a class action because "the court was
convinced that all members of the class had relied on defendant's
misrepresentation. 12 A similar result was reached in Mader v.
Armel, 3 in which the Sixth Circuit stated: "[I]f reliance is a prerequisite to the rule, it is 'little more than a formal requirement.' '",
In nondisclosure cases involving many persons, the presumption
approach seems particularly useful. In these cases a presumption of
reliance is logical, since the class is assumed to be composed of
reasonable investors. If an undisclosed fact would be material to a
reasonable investor, a class composed of such investors presumptively
would have relied upon that fact. This rationale was directly applied
in Mills v. ElectricAuto-Lite Co.,65 in which the Supreme Court held
that in a proxy case reliance was satisfied by a showing of materiality.
The Court stated:
Where there has been a finding of materiality, a shareholder has made a
ual class members is necessary by suggesting the split trial device. See Korn v. Franchard Corp.,
[1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Sec. L. REP.

93,397, at 91,997-98 (2d Cir. 1972);

Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 301 (2d Cir. 1968); Wolfson v. Solomon, [1971-1972
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 93,343, at 91,842, 91,847 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (liability and damages may need to be tried separately, or even by different juries). In Korn the
court, after noting that "[i]n fraud or lob-5 cases. . . various rules, mechanisms, or presumptions have been put forward for mitigating the problem of showing reliance ...
" cited with
approval the following approaches:
Split trials for individual proof of reliance . . . ; inferring from the materiality of the
misstatement that a reasonable investor would have relied; stressing general reliance on
a common course of conduct over a period of time, dispensing with or minimizing the
need to prove individual reliance in cases of nondisclosure; using the test, in instances
of omission, of whether the claimant would have been influenced to act differently, if
the undisclosed fact had been made known, than he in fact did. Id. at 91,997-98 (citations
omitted).
61. 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
62. 340 F.2d at 463.
63. 402 F.2d 158 (6th Cir. 1968).
64. Id. at 163, citing Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
951 (1968), and quoting III Loss, supra note 4, at 735 (2d ed. 1961).
65. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
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sufficient showing of causal relationship between the violation and the injury
for which he seeks redress if, as here, he proves that the proxy solicitation
itself, rather than the particular defect in the solicitation materials, was an
essential link in the accomplishment of the transaction."

After agreeing with the court of appeals that "[r]eliance by thousands
of individuals, as here, can scarcely be inquired into,' 67 the Court
found that the plaintiffs had established their case by showing that
the proxies necessary for corporate action had been obtained through
a "materially misleading solicitation." 6
If a presumption of reliance is appropriate in a nondisclosure case
brought as a class action, it should also be appropriate in a class
action misrepresentation case. If a material misrepresentation
reaches a class, the members of that class, if assumed to be reasonable, can be presumed to have relied upon that misrepresentation.
Recently, in Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc.," the Third Circuit reached this conclusion in a rule lOb-5 misrepresentation case,
stating:
We think those alleging a violation of Rule lOb-5 have an obligation to show
a fraudulent and material misrepresentation and that, to the extent a reliance
it is encompassed by the finding that
factor is required, in the present context
70
the misrepresentation was material.

Other factors may justify the reliance presumption. The Supreme
Court in the Affiliated Ute Citizens case7' apparently concluded that
proof of reliance is not required in nondisclosure cases in which a
special relation of trust and confidence exists. In that case, employees
of a bank charged with the responsibility of advising mixed-blood
Indians regarding transactions in securities utilized their position of
trust and confidence to induce the Indians to sell their securities to
themselves and their friends and did not disclose the true value of the
shares.7" The Court stated:
Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure to disclose,
66. Id. at 385.
67. Id. at 380.
68. Id. at 386.
69. 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1972).
70. Id. at 269, referring to a rule 10b-5 case based upon a proxy violation, Crane Co. v.
Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
71. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
72. Additionally, the defendants had a duty of disclosure because of their position as
market markers in the stock. Id. at 153. The court reasoned by analogy from a case involving
non-disclosure by a brokerage firm engaged in market-making activities, Chasins v. Smith,
Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970).
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positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary
is that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable investor
might have considered them important in the making of this decision."

The Supreme Court's apparent elimination of the reliance requirement can be reconciled with a presumption theory, since the Court
first found the existence of a relationship upon which the plaintiffs
could be presumed to have relied.
Despite the pressures toward elimination of reliance in class action cases, retention of the requirement seems desirable as a method
of permitting courts to arrive at just results. In litigation resulting
from a face-to-face transaction, the defendant should not be denied
the opportunity to present proof that the plaintiff did not rely upon
his misrepresentation or omission. In the class action setting, even
though reliance may be presumed, the defendant should similarly
have the opportunity to present proof that the presumption of reliance is incorrect. In class action litigation such proof might merely
amount to further argument regarding materiality, but it could center
around other factors, such as the question of whether corrective material reached the class. 74 If such a presumption were accepted as to the
class, that broad presumption should not foreclose proof that a particular member of the class did not rely. Since the practical result of
the presumption technique as thus applied would be to shift the burden of going forward, it seems likely that proof regarding a particular
member of the class would be forthcoming only when the amount at
issue with regard to that member justified the expense of the defense.
CAUSATION

The reliance and materiality requirements sometimes are intertwined with the concept of causation. For instance, in List v. Fashion
Park, Inc. 75 the court refused to abandon the reliance requirement
because it was unwilling to be regarded as "reading out of the rule
'7
so basic an element of tort law as the principle of causation in fact.
Properly treated, the concept of causation should be.divided into
two aspects-causation in fact and legal cause." The factual cause
73. 406 U.S. at 153-54.
74. See Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 102-03 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1004 (1971); Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp. 548, 559-62 (D. Utah
1970), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub. nora., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d
90 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972).
75. 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
76. id. at 463.
77. The influence of tort law on rule lOb-5 continues. For provocative discussions of cause
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element should require a showing that defendant's activities alleged
to have violated rule lOb-5 were a "substantial factor" in plaintiff's
injury. Determination of this factual question gives the trier of fact
another means of reaching an equitable result. On the other hand,
once the plaintiff has shown causation in fact, the defendant might
still avoid liability by showing that his action was not a "legal" cause
of plaintiff's injury. Legal cause questions require analysis of duty
and other policy elements, which provides a court with further
opportunity to influence outcome.
Causation principles were applied in Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.7 In holding that plaintiff Karlson could not recover from
Texas Gulf Sulphur for the company's misleading press release because it was issued after his sale, the court implicitly determined that
no factual cause existed between Karlson's sale in December of 1963
and the company's misleading statement in April of 1964. 79 However,
with regard to defendant Fogarty, who purchased Texas Gulf Sulphur
shares without disclosing inside information known to him, a finding
of factual cause would have been possible. Fogarty's purchases took
place both before and after Karlson's sale, and had Fogarty disclosed
inside information known to him, Karlson arguably would not have
sold. In finding that Fogarty was not liable to Karlson, 0 the court
relied upon legal cause or duty language, stating that Fogarty did not
owe a duty to disclose during the period in which there were good
reasons for the company to keep the information secret."
To the extent that the inquiry regarding causation centers on
cause in the factual sense, the trier of fact will be given another area
in which to exercise judgment in determining whether liability should
be imposed. The "substantial factor" test, which requires that the
defendant's conduct be a substantial factor in bringing about harm
to the plaintiff, provides an opportunity for considerations of fairness
to be brought into play. 2 Even when it can be shown that the harm
would not have occurred had the alleged wrongdoer's activities not
problems, see Green, Duties, Risks, Causation Doctrines,41 TEx. L. REV. 42 (1962); Green,
The Causal Relation Issue In Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REV. 543 (1962).
78. 309 F. Supp. 548 (D. Utah 1970), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom., Mitchell v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972).
79. Id. at 559.
80. Id. The district court also stated that privity of contract is not required in a rule lob-5
action. Id. at 558. See notes 37-38 supra and accompanying text.
81. 309 F. Supp. at 558-59.
82. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435-39 (1965) (dealing with the
causal relation necessary for responsibility for negligence). Use of causation concepts does not
promise clarity or predictability, since the role of causation in legal theory generally is far from
clear.
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taken place, the trier of fact should be allowed to decide that the
activities were not substantial enough in relation to plaintiff's harm
to justify the imposition of liability.
THE SCIENTER OR INTENT REQUIREMENT

Three elements of rule lOb-5 purchase and sale actions which can
be considered by the trier of fact in order to determine outcome have
been discussed-materiality, reliance and causation. Interpretation
of doctrines of scienter or intent may be equally important. However,
despite numerous cases and much comment dealing with problems of
state of mind under rule lOb-5, s3 little clarity exists regarding the
existence of an intent or scienter requirement under the rule. Analysis
of the state of mind problem can be aided by careful definition. One
approach toward definition follows:
1. Deliberate conduct exists when the defendant has an intent to
injure others.
2. Knowing conduct exists when the defendant acts with the
knowledge that his acts may injure others. Knowing conduct would
include knowing misrepresentation or nondisclosure.
3. Reckless conduct exists when the defendant acts in conscious
disregard of, or indifference to, the risk that others will be misled.
This conduct includes what is sometimes referred to as "gross negligence."
4. Negligent conduct exists when the defendant acts unreasonably but ,does not act with conscious disregard of consequences.
5. Innocent conduct exists when the defendant cannot reasonably be expected to know the true facts. 4
The above definitions become important as a means of providing
dividing lines in order to determine which conduct is culpable. In
securities law fraud cases under rule lOb-5, the crucial question is
whether negligent conduct does or should give rise to liability. According to one commentator, scienter is established when the defendant intends to defraud, has actual knowledge, or has acted in reckless disregard of the truth:
83. For comment regarding the confusion, see Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458
F.2d 255, 270, 279-89, 312-16 (3d Cir. 1972) (dissenting opinion of Adams, J.); Bucklo, Scienter
and Rule lOb-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 562 (1972); Ruder, Multiple Defendants, supra note 38, at
631.
84. These categories are drawn from Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round,

supra note 21, at 435-37, which relies in turn upon W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
TORTS 715-19 (3d ed. 1964).

OF THE LAW OF
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To summarize, scienter should be interpreted to mean knowledge of the facts,
either actual or constructive. The latter is found when a defendant's lack of
knowledge is the result of conduct sufficiently careless that knowledge will be
attributed. Although a court in such a case may not be convinced that the
defendant did actually know the facts, his lack of knowledge is inexcusable.
Negligence, in contrast, refers to conduct not wholly innocent but not so
careless as to be inexcusable.85

The confusion in semantics regarding the proper definition of
scienter has resulted in great uncertainty between and even within

federal circuit courts interpreting rule lOb-5. 8 For instance, in two
cases decided in 1972, the Seventh Circuit articulated what seem to

be inconsistent expressions of the scienter requirement. In Parrentv.
Midwest Rug Mills, Inc.87 the court agreed with the statement in

Vanderboom v. Sexton,"8 an Eighth Circuit case, that scienter is not
a necessary element in rule lOb-5 cases.8 9 Subsequently, in Dasho v.
Susquehanna Corp.9" the Seventh Circuit seemed to acknowledge a
scienter requirement in rule lOb-5 actions, stating with regard to
certain defendants that "to the extent intent is relevant the evidence

be some defenis adequate,"'" while with regard to others "there may
92
dants who did not have the requisite state of mind. 1

Basing the dividing line regarding culpability upon the distinction
between recklessness and negligence offers the trier of fact the best

opportunity to achieve just results. Despite the seeming inconsistency
in circuit court language, this dividing line appears to be the uniform
standard chosen. After an exhaustive survey of rule lOb-5 cases, one
commentator has stated:
85. Bucklo, supra note 83, at 570.
86. For lists of decisions of courts of appeal, see Ruder, Multiple Defendants, supra note
38, at 632 n.154. See also Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 286 (3d Cir.
1972) (dissenting opinion of Adams, J.). One commentator has examined the holdings of each
circuit in detail. See Bucklo, supra note 83, at 598-600.
87. 455 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1972).
88. 422 F.2d 1233, 1238-39 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970).
89. 455 F.2d at 126. After discussing interpretations of section 10(b) in other circuits, the
court in Vanderboom had stated:
This Court has said that "[p]roof of 'scienter,' i.e., knowledge of the falseness of the
impression produced by the statements or omissions made, is not required under Section
10(b) of the Act." (citations omitted). 422 F.2d at 1239.
The Parrent court reached its interpretation of the scienter requirement in the course of deciding which state statute of limitations to apply. See notes 102-07, 118-21 infra and accompanying
text.
90. 461 F.2d 11 (7th Cir. 1972).
91. Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 29-30 n.45.
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Examination of all the circuit court decisions discussing the scienter problem
reveals that liability has yet to be imposed in a private action for damages
where the defendant's conduct was merely negligent; damage awards to private
plaintiffs have been confined
to cases where either knowing or reckless conduct
3
was the cause of injury.

Obviously, a trier of fact will have enormous leeway in deciding
whether conduct was reckless or merely negligent. A finding of recklessness can be made when fairness points to liability, while a finding
of mere negligence or "good faith" should serve as a statement that
the defendant's conduct did not warrant the imposition of liability
under the circumstances of the case.
In choosing a dividing line based upon the defendant's state of
mind, it should be noted that concern over finding this line stems
primarily from the open-ended liability resulting from dispensing
with the privity requirement. When a face-to-face transaction takes
place, it makes sense to relax the culpability requirement in order to
allow parties who have been persuaded by negligent or innocent misrepresentations to obtain the return of their property or funds. This
result is consistent with the common law concept permitting an action
for rescission based upon innocent misrepresentation. 4
The above analysis points to the same conclusion regarding the
scienter or intent requirement as that reached with regard to the
elements of materiality, reliance and causation. Although the expressed standard being utilized in a given case may differ, the application of that standard will afford the trier of fact an opportunity to
achieve fair results under all of the circumstances. Applying these
elements in combination affords further flexibility with regard to
outcome.
STATUTES OF LIMITATION

A fifth area in which the trier of fact may influence result is in
applying statutes of limitation. In reviewing limitation statutes the
trier of fact must determine whether the plaintiff has brought suit
within the specified time period. The trier of fact can influence result
either by deciding that the plaintiff has or has not brought suit within
the applicable period or by limiting the period for which damages
may be assessed.
93. Bucklo, supra note 83, at 563 (citations omitted).
94. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 709, 711 (4th ed. 1971). See also the discussion of
the relationship of foreseeability and state of mind in non-privity cases in Ruder, Multiple
Defendants, supra note 38, at 612-18.
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A second factual determination which may influence the result is

an inquiry regarding the question of whether application of the relevant statute has been delayed or tolled. Although it seems well settled

that the "federal tolling doctrine" as expressed in Holmberg v.
Armbrecht95 applies to rule lOb-5 actions, " the meaning of that tolling doctrine is not clear. The soundest interpretation seems to be that
where a person has been injured by fraud, his lack of diligence in

pursuing his rights, which normally would bar his claim, will be
excused by a defendant's fraudulent concealment. This standard implies further that a plaintiff can assert the tolling doctrine even in the

absence of defendant's concealment if the plaintiff was diligent in his
efforts to discover the fraud.9"
Although factual determinations regarding tolling and plaintiff's

compliance with the applicable limitation period should provide
95. 327 U.S. 392 (1946). See Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 348 (1874).
96. See Azalea Meats, Inc. v. Muscat, 386-F.2d 5, 8 (5th Cir. 1967); Janigan v. Taylor,
344 F.2d 781, 784 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965). The federal tolling doctrine
apparently applies to state limitation periods employed by federal,courts in rule lOb-5 actions
even though the state provision specifically provides that the statute shall not be tolled.
97. This interpretation is derived from the Holmberg case in which the Supreme Court
stated:
If want of due diligence by the plaintiff may make it unfair to pursue the defendant,
fraudulent conduct on the part of the defendant may have prevented the plaintiff from
being diligent and may make it unfair to bar appeal to equity because of mere lapse of
time.
Equity will not lend itself to such fraud and historically has relieved from it. It bars
a defendant from setting up such a fraudulent defense, as it interposes against other
forms of fraud. And so this Court long ago adopted as its own the old chancery rule
that where a plaintiff has been injured by fraud and "remains in ignorance of it without
any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute does not begin
to run until the fraud is discovered, though there be no special circumstances or efforts
on the part of the party committing the fraud to conceal it from the knowledge of the
other party ..
"
This equitable doctrine is read into every federal statute of limitation. If the Federal
Farm Loan Act had an explicit statute of limitation for bringing suit under § 16, the
time would not have begun to run until after petitioners had discovered or had failed in
reasonable diligence to discover the alleged deception by Bache which is the basis of this
suit. 327 U.S. at 396-97 (citations omitted).
See also Schulman, Statutes of Limitation in lOb-5 Actions: Complication Added to Confusion, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 635, 638 (1967) ("if the federal action is denominated fraud, the
limitation period commences from the time of plaintiff's diligent discovery of the wrong
"). An even more liberal interpretation of the Holmberg case appears in Janigan v.
...
Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 784 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965) ("Federal law has long
been established, with more liberality than that of Massachusetts, that where fraud is involved
the cause of action is, so-to-speak, automatically concealed, and does not arise until discovery.").
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means of achieving fairness, results in the limitation area are frequently unfair because the procedure for selecting a limitation period
to be applied in rule lOb-5 actions does not yield uniform results."
The selection of a limitation period, in contrast with the factual
determinations discussed above, involves a court decision regarding
a question of law. Since Congress did not enact a specific limitation
period for section 10(b) actions, federal courts have limited such
actions by using forum state limitation periods. 9 Limitation periods
ranging from one to ten years have been applied in section 10(b)
actions as a result of differences in the forums selected and differences in court decisions regarding which statute should be used within
a particular forum."0
Most recently, federal courts have chosen the applicable limitation period by applying a "resemblance test." Basically, the court will
first determine what the substantive elements of a rule lOb-5 action
are in that circuit; second, look to law of the forum state to ascertain
where that type of action fits into the state statutory scheme; and
third, apply the state limitation period that most closely resembles
the rule lOb-5 action.10' A recent example of this approach appears
98. See III L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1774-76 (2d ed. 1961); Schulman, supra note
97, at 641-43.
99. See, e.g., Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1972); Sackett v.
Beaman, 399 F.2d 884, 890 (9th Cir. 1968); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 783 (ist Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965). See also Schulman, supra note 97, at 638-42.
The theory that state statutes should provide the source of limitation periods when a federal
statute is silent on the matter is set forth in UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696
(1966), where the Supreme Court considered the question of what limitation statute applied to
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1970). The
statute did not contain an overall limitation provision for implied private actions brought under
section 301. Rejecting the position that the Court should "devise a uniform time limitation to
close the statutory gap left by Congress," the Court concluded that "there is no justification
for the drastic sort of judicial legislation that is urged upon us." 383 U.S. at 701-03. The Court
held that state statutes of limitation rather than a judicially created limitation period would
govern implied private actions brought under section 301. A similar result has occurred in lower
court decisions involving implied private rights of action under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.
The Supreme Court has not ruled on the question. See Schulman, supra note 97, at 638-42.
100. E.g., Denny v. Performance Systems, Inc., [1971-72 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 93,387 (M.D. Tenn. 1971) (Tennessee 10 year general limitation period); Weiser v.
Schwartz, 286 F. Supp. 389 (E.D. La. 1968) (Louisiana one year fraud statute). Each state has
several different limitation periods that could be applied to a rule lob-5 action. These include
limitation periods applicable to fraud actions, periods for contract or tort actions, blue sky
periods, and state "catch-all" limitation periods.
101. See. e.g., Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d. 123 (7th Cir. 1972); Mitchell
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971); Douglass v. Glenn E. Hinton Inv.
Inc., 440 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1971); Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir. 1970);
Charney v. Thomas, 372 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1967).
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in Parrentv. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc. ,102 in which the Seventh Circuit
held that the three year limitation period of the Illinois Securities Act

of 195311 applied to rule lOb-5 claims." 4 The court found that the
Illinois blue sky law had the same basic purposes as the federal law,

contained similar provisions and, except for the interstate elements
of rule 1Ob-5, covered the same violations.0 5 The court noted that the
statute of limitations under the Illinois Securities Law paralleled the
express limitation periods in other sections of the 1934 Act.0 6 In

declining to apply the Illinois limitation period for actions based on
fraud, the court announced the proposition that neither the Illinois
nor federal securities law requires a plaintiff to prove scienter on the

part of the defendant. 107
Prior to its Parrent decision the Seventh Circuit had followed

other courts in choosing a statute of limitations based upon fraud.,
In light of many decisions characterizing rule lob-5 as an "antifraud" provision, federal courts usually have applied the limitation
period thought to govern fraud actions." 9 In a 1967 case, Charney v.
102. 455 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1972).
103. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 , § 137.13 (Smith-Hurd 1960).
104. 455 F.2d at 127.
105. Id. at 127-28.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 128.
108. Morgan v. Koch, 419 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1969); Butterman v. Steiner, 343 F.2d 519
(7th Cir. 1965); Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Il1.
1952).
109. The following illustrative decisions by courts of appeal have applied state limitation
periods other than "blue sky" periods to rule lOb-5 actions:
First Circuit: Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
879 (1965).
Second Circuit: Klein v. Auchincloss, Parker & Redpath, 436 F.2d 339 (2d Cir.
1972); H.L. Green Co. v. MacMahon, 312 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 928 (1963); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1956).
Third Circuit: Tobacco & Allied Stocks, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 244 F.2d 902
(3d Cir. 1957).
Fifth Circuit: Azalea Meats, Inc. v. Muscat, 386 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1967); Hooper v.
Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960). But see Aboussie v. Aboussie,
441 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1971).
Sixth Circuit: Charney v. Thomas, 372 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1967).
Ninth Circuit: Douglas v. Glenn E. Hinton Inv., Inc., 440 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1971);
Sackett v. Beaman, 399 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1968); Turner v. Lindquist, 377 F.2d 44 (9th
Cir. 1967); Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956); Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d
627 (9th Cir. 1953).
Tenth Circuit: Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
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Thomas, 10 the Sixth Circuit began a new approach by suggesting that
the state securities law period should be used in rule lOb-5 actions
rather than the state fraud limitation period. Although the court
chose to apply a fraud statute, it did so on the theory that the Michigan blue sky statute did not have a provision resembling rule lOb-5.
The court hinted, however, that it would have applied a blue sky
limitation period had one been in existence."'
Subsequently, in Vanderboom v. Sexton,12 the Eighth Circuit
interpreted the Charney decision to mean that the limitation provision must be one that best effectuates the federal policy at issue.
Comparing rule lOb-5 to state common and statutory law, the court
affirmed a district court's holding that the defendants' rule lOb-5
claim was barred by the Arkansas two-year blue sky statute of limita3
tions."
The contrasting results reached in the Sixth and Eighth Circuits
can be traced to their differing articulations of the scienter requirement in a rule lob-5 action. In Charney, the Sixth Circuit characterized a rule lOb-5 action as analogous to common law fraud, requiring
some proof of scienter."14 The court concluded that because of the
difficult problem of proving scienter, plaintiffs should be allowed the
advantage of a longer limitation period in a rule 10b-5 action." 5 In
Vanderboom, the Eighth Circuit stated that scienter was not a necessary element in rule lOb-5 actions"' and that plaintiffs could recover
The following circuit courts have applied state "blue sky" limitation periods to Rule lOb-5
actions:
Seventh Circuit: Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 445 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1972).
Eighth Circuit: Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400

U.S. 852 (1970).
There are no reported cases for the Fourth and District of Columbia Circuits.
110. 372 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1967).
111. Id. at 100. The Charney court discussed the interpretations of section 10(b) actions
by other courts which had concluded that a rule lob-5 action was similar to an action for

common law fraud. It acknowledged that despite some differences between actions based upon
rule lOb-5 and those based upon common law fraud, the applicable statute should be the

Michigan fraud statute. With regard to the Michigan blue sky statute, the court stated:
Although in some cases the local Blue Sky Law might be the more appropriate point
of reference, in the present case the Michigan law contains no provisions similar to
section 10(b) of the federal law. Id.
112. 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir. 1970).
113. Id. at 1237-39, citing A. BROMBERG, SECURITIEs LAW FRAUD-SEC RULE 10B-5

§ 2.5(1) n. 105 (limitation provisions in state Blue Sky laws, which are aimed at securities fraud,
would seem to be an obvious choice in lob-5 cases.).
114. 372 F.2d at 99.
115. Id.
116. 422 F.2d at 139. See note 89 supra.
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for negligent misrepresentations." 7
The difficulties caused by determining the applicable state statute
of limitations through use of a "resemblance" test are well illustrated
not only by the differing results in the Charney and Vanderboom
decisions but also by the confusion caused in the Seventh Circuit by
the recent Parrentcase. In Parrent,the Seventh Circuit's selection of
a three year statute was based in part upon absence of a scienter
requirement." 8 At approximately the same time, the Seventh Circuit
intimated in Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp."9 that a scienter requirement still exists.' These cases have created confusion regarding the
existence of a scienter requirement in the Seventh Circuit. They demonstrate an unfortunate judicial tendency to deal in the abstract with
the substantive elements of a rule lOb-5 action. Certainly, the important question of whether proof of scienter is necessary in a rule lOb5 action should not be decided in the context of determining which
statute of limitations should be applicable.
The Parrent decision was justified in part on the grounds that
application of the Illinois blue sky limitation period would promote
greater uniformity-in situations involving a violation of both the
federal and Illinois securities laws, a uniform limitation period could
be used by the court.' 2' Although the search for uniformity is to be
applauded, the Parrent decision achieves uniformity in only limited
circumstances.
Uniformity breaks down even within the Seventh Circuit, since
the blue sky limitation periods of the states in that circuit vary widely.
The Illinois blue sky law provides that an action shall be brought
within three years from the time of the wrong; 2 Indiana requires suit
within two years from the date of discovery; 23 and Wisconsin allows
an action to be brought within one year of discovery but not later than
three years from the time of the wrong.'24 Application of the resemblance test developed in the Parrent decision thus could result in the
application of any one of three different limitation periods, depending
on which state is treated as the forum state. The lack of uniformity
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
See note 107 supra and accompanying text.
461 F.2d 11 (7th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 30. See notes 90-92 supra and accompanying text.
455 F.2d at 127. See also Richardson v. Salinas, 336 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Tex. 1972).
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 , § 137.13D (Smith-Hurd 1960).

123. IND.
124. Wis.

ANN. STAT.
STAT. ANN.

§ 25-873 (2)(e) (1970).
§ 551.59 (5) (1972).
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within circuits further complicates the lack of uniformity between
circuits referred to earlier. 2 1Other complications arise when differing
limitation periods may be applicable. In addition to deciding which
of several statutes within a single state should be applied, a federal
court must resolve conflicts of laws problems in choosing which
state's laws govern the choice of the limitation statute. It sometimes
must ask the difficult question, "Where did the cause of action
arise?"126 Moreover, as part of its conflicts of laws decision, a court
may be faced with problems caused by borrowing statutes, which, in
general, provide that if the action has been barred by the limitation
statute of the jurisdiction in which the cause of action originated, suit
in another forum will not result in the application of the longer
12 7
limitation period of that forum.
The best solution to the limitation question would be to look to
federal rather than state law for a limitation period. The federal
securities laws provide a ready source from which to choose a limitation period. When dealing with express liability provisions of the
federal securities acts, Congress adopted relatively uniform limitation
provisions. A one and three year limitation period is contained in
section 13 of the 1933 Act128 and sections 9(e), 18(c), and 29(b) of the
1934 Act. 2 1 Section 9(e) is typical:
No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under this
section, unless brought within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within three years after such violation.,3 '
125. See note 100 supra and accompanying text.
126. See Saylor v. Lindsley, 302 F. Supp. 1174, 1179-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), rev'd on other
grounds. 456 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1972).
127. See Trussel v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 236 F. Supp. 801 (D. Colo. 1964). On a
motion to dismiss one defendant raised the issue of whether the Colorado or Kansas limitation
provisions should apply. The court held that it was bound to apply the law of the forum state
with respect to the applicable limitation period, "and that this may require the adoption of the
forum state's 'borrowing statute,'" 236 F. Supp. at 803, citing Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S.
461 (1946). The Colorado borrowing statute applied by the court provides:
When a cause of action arises in another state or territory or in a foreign.country, and
by the laws thereof an action thereon cannot be maintained against a person by reason
of the lapse of time, an action thereon shall not be maintained against him in this state.
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 87-1-19 (1963).
While the district court applied the Kansas two year limitation provision, it did not dismiss
the plaintiff's claim because the federal tolling doctrine applied irrespective of the applicable
limitation provision. 236 F. Supp. at 803.
128. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1970).
129. Id.§§ 78i(e), r(c), cc(b).
130. Id. § 78i(e). Section 18(c) of the 1934 Act, id. 78r(c), expressly provides for a one and
three year limitation period for misleading statements. In addition, section 29(b), id. § 78cc(b),
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These limitation periods represent a Congressional viewpoint fixing
limitation periods for actions based upon violation of the securities
laws which could easily be followed by federal courts.
Choice of the federal limitation period not only would create
uniformity but would correct what must be judged as a mistake in
application of principle. Historically, the application of state statutes
of limitation to federally created rights of action have developed
13
because express federal limitation periods have not been available. '
The rationale for applying state statutes of limitation to federal securities law actions originated in a non-securities law case, Campbell v.
Haverhill,132 in which the plaintiffs brought a patent infringement
suit based on a federal statute which had no limitation period. The
defendant argued that the claim was barred by a Massachusetts six
year limitation period. Rejecting plaintiff's argument that the laws of
the states have no application to causes of action "created by Con' 33
gressional legislation and enforceable only in the Federal courts,"'
the Court held the state limitation period applied. The Court supported its decision by suggesting that Congress surely would not have
intended that the underlying right would exist with no time limitation
whatsoever. It stated:
In creating a new right and providing a court for the enforcement of such right,
must we not assume that Congress intended that the remedy should be enforced in the manner common to like actions within the same jurisdiction?
Unless this be the law, we have the anomaly of a distinct class of actions
subject to no limitation whatever; a class of privileged plaintiffs who, in this
particular, are outside the pale of the law, and subject to no limitation of time
in which they may institute their actions."u

The assumption after Haverhill that no federal statute could exist
contains a special one and three year provision applicable to contracts void under sections
15(c)(2) and (3), id. §§78o(c)(2), (3). Section 16(b), id.§ 78p(b), contains a two year limitation
period. Section 13 of the 1933 Act, id. § 77m, contains a similar one and three year limitation
period applicable to sections I1,12(1), (2), id. §§ 77k, 1(l),(2). Originally, the 1933 Act provided for a two year limitation period from the date of discovery of the fraudulent misrepresentations and an overall ten year limitation period for all actions except those under section 12(2).
Act of May 27, 1933, ch. 38, § 13, 48 Stat. 84. In 1934 the Act was amended to provide for
the one and three year period in section 13. Act of June 6, 1934, ch. 404, § 207, 48 Stat. 908.
See Schulman, supra note 97, at 637.
131. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971); UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp.,
383 U.S. 696 (1966); McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958); Schulman,
supra note 97, at 638-39.
132. 155 U.S. 610 (1895).
133. Id.at 614.
134. Id.at 616.
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by implication seems unjustified.13 As noted by several Supreme

Court justices, statutes of limitation contained in similar federal laws
may provide ready and logical sources from which to draw limitation
provisions by implication. 31 In federal securities law litigation, the
choice is not between a state statute and none at all, but between an
analogous federal limitation period and a multitude of state statutes." 7
Several leading commentators have concluded that reference to

federal securities laws is the most logical solution to the limitation
problem.1 38 Professor Loss has suggested that federal courts now
faced with choosing between various state statutes should look instead to an analogous federal statute for a limitation period:
When such a statute does exist-vide § 13-is it not eminently more consistent with the overall statutory scheme to look to what Congress itself did
when it was thinking specifically of private actions in securities cases rather
than to a grab-bag of more or less analogous state statutes.13 9
135. See McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221, 227 (1958) (Brennan, J.,
concurring). In that case the court rejected a lower court decision applying a two year Texas
limitation period to an action for negligence under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970). The
Court held that the limitation period applicable to the federal act could not be less than three
years. Concurring, Justice Brennan said:
I do not believe that the absence of specific directions from Congress leads necessarily to the result that state statutes of limitations should apply in cases of this sort. The
reason is that the considerations which in Campbell v. Haverhill . . . and Cope v.
Anderson. . . prompted resort to the state statutes do not apply at all here. Those cases
represented intensely practical solutions to a practical problem in the administration of
justice. In the absence of any comparablefederal statute of limitations which might be
applied, the Court had four choices: (1) No period of limitations at all; (2) an arbitrary
period applicable in all like cases; (3) the flexible but uncertain doctrine of laches; and
(4) state statutes of limitations. The state statutes were chosen by default. 357 U.S. at
228-29 (emphasis added).
Justice Brennan argued that the three year limitation period of the Jones Act was the logical
source from which to draw an analogous limitation provision. Id. at 229. See also UAW v.
Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 709 (1966) (White, J., dissenting).
136. See notes 128-35 supra and cases cited therein.
137. See UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 709-14 (1966) (White, J., dissenting).
138. See VI L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGuLATION 3899 (1969 Supp.) (citing Schulman, supra
note 97). See also Israels, Book Review, 77 YALE L.J. 1585, 1591 (1968) (concurring with a
similar conclusion reached by Professor Bromberg. See 2 A. BRONIBERG, SECURITIEs LAW
FRAUD: SEC RULE lob-5 284). Professor Loss, Reporter for the American Law Institute on
the proposed Federal Securities Code, has recently stated that the limitation problem concerning section 10(b) and rule lob-5 is one that is in "crying need" of rationalization. Professor
Loss ends his discussion of the limitation "anomaly" with the question-"Why should there
be a longer period for implied rights of action than for express? I'm not suggesting that we
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CONCLUSION

In attempting to analyze ways in which factual determinations
may influence results in rule lOb-5 cases, this article has referred to
five areas: materiality, reliance, causation, scienter, and statutes of
limitation. The basic proposition asserted is that fair results will be
reached if the trier of fact has many areas of flexibility in which to
make decisions favorable to the person or persons it deems to have
the greatest equities. As a corollary to the basic proposition, the
discussion of each area has carried with it the following suggestions
for shaping legal theory in ways so that flexibility will be preserved
for the trier of fact.
1. Materiality. The flexible definition of materiality should be
preserved.
2. Reliance. In litigation arising from face-to-face transactions,
the plaintiff should meet the burden of proving reliance. In impersonal class actions resulting from market transactions, proof of
reliance can be presumed, but the defendant should be entitled to
offer proof negating the presumption either as to the class or as to
an individual member of the class.
3. Causation. Factual inquiry regarding cause in fact should
center upon the question whether defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in plaintiff's loss. The concept of legal cause should be
recognized and treated as involving policy determinations.
4. Scienter. In most cases the line distinguishing liability from
non-liability should be whether the defendant's conduct was deliber-ate, knowing, or reckless. In cases arising from face-to-face transactions, however, the common law concepts of rescission based upon
negligent or even innocent conduct should be maintained.
5. Statutes of limitation. A uniform federal statute of limitations should replace the present system of searching for the applicable
state statute. In any event, cases involving statutes of limitation are
inappropriate vehicles for determining policy issues regarding scienter and other elements of rule lOb-5 cases.
These comments reflect the general and broad language of rule
lOb-5, the ad hoc nature of developments under the rule, the trend
should shorten the one-perhaps we should lengthen the other-but there is an anomaly there."
ALI FED. SEC. CODE xxxvii-viii (Tentative Draft No. 2, April 25, 1972) (approved in part May,

1972).
139. VI L. Loss, supra note 138.
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toward flexible interpretation of the securities laws, and the existence
of implied private rights of action based upon the need to provide
remedies for conduct declared unlawful by the Congress and the
Securities and Exchange Commission. Until Congress and the SEC
move to create a more orderly system, the responsibility for achieving
orderly development lies with the courts. Hopefully, future court
decisions will be guided by the need to provide careful guidelines
under which limitations on rule lOb-5 liability will reflect considerations of fairness.

